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Abstract. Much is still unknown about how children learn language,
but it is clear that they perform “grounded” language learning: they learn
the grammar and vocabulary not just from examples of sentences, but
from examples of sentences in a particular context. Grounded language
learning has been the subject of much research. Most of this work focuses
on particular aspects, such as constructing semantic parsers, or on par-
ticular types of applications. In this paper, we take a broader view that
includes an aspect that has received little attention until now: learning
the meaning of phrases from phrase/context pairs in which the phrase’s
meaning is not explicitly represented. We propose a simple model for this
task that uses first-order logic representations for contexts and meanings,
including a simple incremental learning algorithm. We experimentally
demonstrate that the proposed model can explain the gradual learning
of simple concepts and language structure, and that it can easily be used
for interpretation, generation, and translation of phrases.
1 Introduction
Despite the complexity of natural languages, children are able to acquire their
native language quite easily, efficiently and without any specific training. This
human ability is not yet fully understood, even though it has been studied by
researchers from many different areas: psychology, linguistics, . . .
In computer science, grammatical inference (GI) deals with the learning of
grammars and languages from data. Although historically this task has been
associated with that of children acquiring their native language, most research
in GI reduces the language learning problem to syntax learning, and does not use
semantic information in this process [7]. Children, however, do have additional
information, derived from the context in which utterances are made, and they
learn not only the syntax but also the semantics of utterances. This type of
learning is often called grounded language learning.
Grounded language learning is a broad research area. Most of this research
focuses on particular aspects of the problem, such as semantic parsing (which
maps sentences to their semantics), or on specific types of applications. In this
paper, we propose a model for grounded language learning that uses a first-order
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logic representation of contexts and meanings. We present a learning algorithm
that analyzes utterances and the context in which they are produced to create
a language model that can be used to map sentences onto meanings and vice
versa. An important difference with earlier work [9, 4, 3, 11, 13] is that our learner
learns from sentence/context pairs, whereas earlier work requires the meaning,
or a set of candidate meanings, to be provided for each example sentence. That
is, earlier work used examples of the form (x, y), with y = f(x), or (x, Y ) with
f(x) ∈ Y , to learn the function f that maps sentences to their meaning; our work
uses examples of the form (x,C) with a more complex relationship between the
context description C and the meaning f(x).
2 Background and related work
Our work is mainly inspired by Angluin and Becerra-Bonache [1, 2], who present,
for the first time in the field of GI, a computational model that takes into account
semantics for language learning. Their main goal was to investigate the effects of
semantics and meaning-preserving corrections on the language learning process.
Our work mainly differs from their work in the type of methods adopted to solve
the problem. Instead of using a variety of techniques such as transducers, co-
occurrence graphs, decision trees, etc., we use a single model represented in first
order logic. Language comprehension and generation are then achieved with a
simple query to this model. The simplicity of our approach is appealing from a
cognitive point of view.
Within computational linguistics, much research exists on grounded language
learning. Different from GI, most of this work does not aim to learn the grammar
itself or understand the learning process, but to develop systems that can deal
with natural language data in a particular application. Much of it focuses on se-
mantic parsing. Semantic parsers are often learned from a supervised corpus con-
taining sentences with their meaning representation [20, 15, 21], but constructing
such a corpus is expensive, difficult and time-consuming.
In order to avoid this limitation, researchers have investigated grounded
learning from ambiguous training data, where each sentence is associated with a
small set of candidate meanings. In seminal work on grounded language learning,
Siskind [19] focused on learning word meaning, but not grammatical structure.
In a series of work, Mooney and colleagues [9, 4, 3, 11] learn to match phrases to
elements of a context. Their goals are similar to ours, but an essential difference
is that they only map a phrase to a single element in the context; that is, the
meaning of the phrase must be a single element of the context. Chen et al. [3]
acknowledge this limitation, and mention inductive logic programming (ILP) as
a possible approach to learning more complex meanings, to be explored in future
work. This work partially fills that gap.
Our learner is incremental, which is interesting from a cognitive point of view;
apart from Angluin and Becerra-Bonache, the only other incremental learner we
know of was proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. [13]. Our approach differs substan-
tially from Kwiatkowski’s in that the latter requires a parallel corpus: it can learn
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from ambiguous supervision (multiple candidate meanings per sentence), but for
each sentence the correct meaning must still be constructed in advance and made
available to the learner, whereas our approach construes meanings from scratch.
Our context descriptions are motivated by how the learner perceives the world,
not by what meanings might look like.
3 A logic-based approach
3.1 Terminology
We assume familiarity with first-order logic and Prolog. We here briefly review
the main concepts; for an extensive introduction, see [14].
First-order predicate logic allows us to make statements about objects in
some universe U . A constant always refers to one and the same object from U . A
variable may refer to any object. A term is a variable or a constant. A predicate
refers to a relation over Un for some n ≥ 0; n is the arity of the predicate.
An atom is of the form p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) where p is a predicate symbol and
the ti are terms. A literal is of the form A or ¬A, with A an atom. A clause is
a set of literals. A fact is a clause with exactly one, positive, literal. An atom,
literal or clause is ground if it does not contain variables. A variable substitution
{X1/t1, X2/t2, . . . , Xn/tn} is an operation that, applied to a structure, simulta-
neously replaces each occurrence of variable Xi in that structure by term ti. An
instantiation is a substitution that changes all variables into ground terms.
A ground atom p(t1, t2, . . . , tn) evaluates to true if the tuple denoted by
its arguments is in the relation denoted by p, and false otherwise; literal ¬A
evaluates to true if and only if A evaluates to false and vice versa; a clause
evaluates to true if for each of its instantiations, at least one of its elements
evaluates to true (so it represents a universally quantified disjunction).
We use Prolog syntax: predicates and constants start with a lowercase letter,
variables with an uppercase letter, and a clause of the form {H,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm}
is written as H :- B1, ..., Bm. The meaning of such a clause is equivalent
to “if all Bi hold, then H holds” (for each instantiation of the variables). The
symbol denotes an anonymous variable occurring in only that position.
In Prolog, clauses can be added dynamically to a knowledge base using assert,
and removed using retract.
Example 1. father(joseph, hendrik) is a ground atom. When stated as a fact, it
expresses that the entities referred to by the constants joseph and hendrik are in
a relationship referred to as father; or, briefly: “Joseph is the father of Hendrik”.
The clause ancestor(adam,X) :- human(X) expresses that Adam is an ancestor of
all humans (“for all X it holds that if X is human, Adam is an ancestor of X”).
3.2 Representation
In our learning setting, an example is a pair (C, S) where C is a context and S
is a phrase (a sentence or a part of it). A phrase is represented as a sequence of
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Category Constants Interpretation
Color bl, re, gr, ye, or, pu blue, red, green, yellow, orange, purple
Shape sq, di, tr, he, st, el square, disc, triangle, hexagon, star, ellipse
Size sm, me, bg small, medium-sized, big
Position ab, be, lo, ro above, below, left of, right of
Table 1. Constants used in context descriptions, and their interpretation.
words, a context as a set of ground facts. Our model assumes that everything a
phrase refers to is in the context, but not everything in the context is necessarily
referred to in the phrase.
In our examples and experiments, we use a simplified world model with col-
orful figures, inspired by Feldman et al. [5]. In context descriptions, we use pred-
icates of which it is reasonable to assume that a child, observing the world, has
some notion. For instance, we assume that a child recognizes that being green
and being red are two properties that describe the same aspect of the visual
appearance of an object, and that being square or being round are a different
aspect of that appearance; in other words, it recognizes the concepts “color” and
“shape”, even if it has no word for these (nor for their possible values). In line
with this assumption, we use the following predicates: object(x) (x is an object),
color(x,y), shape(x,y), size(x,y) (the color/shape/size of x is y), relpos(x,r,y) (the
position of x relative to y is r). Constants used for specific colors, shapes and
sizes are shown in Table 1. Note that neither constants nor predicates are hard-
coded in our model; if a new example contains constants or predicates not seen
before, our learner can handle it without any change.
Example 2. A context in which a big red square is to the left of a small green
triangle is represented as {object(o1), shape(o1, sq), color(o1, re), size(o1, bg),
object(o2), shape(o2, tr), color(o2, gr), size(o2, sm), relpos(o1, lo, o2)}.
3.3 Learning the meaning of specific n-grams
The “meaning” of a sentence, phrase or word is difficult to define [6]. In this
work, we use a pragmatic definition: the meaning of an n-gram (a sequence of n
words) is “whatever is in common among all contexts where the n-gram can be
used”.4 We formalize this as follows.
A pattern is an existentially quantified set of atoms (one can think of it
as a Prolog query). Note that a context description can be seen as a variable-
free pattern. A pattern Q subsumes another pattern Q′ if there is a variable
substitution that turns it into a subset of Q′. Two patterns are equivalent if they
subsume each other. Given a set of contexts, their most specific common pattern
is a pattern Q that subsumes all of them and for which no other pattern exists
4 This is in line with the work by Mooney et al. and with Wittgenstein’s views on the
meaning of language.
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that subsumes all of them and is subsumed by Q. The meaning of an n-gram is
the most specific common pattern of all the contexts where it can be used.
The most specific common pattern can be computed using Plotkin’s lgg
(“least general generalization”) operator [17], which is intensively used in in-
ductive logic programming [16].
Example 3. The lgg of the following pair of contexts:
{ object(o1), color(o1, re), shape(o1, sq) }
{ object(o2), color(o2, gr), shape(o2, tr), object(o3), color(o3,re), shape(o3,tr) }
is {object(X), color(X, re), shape(X,Y)}. It captures everything that is in common
among these two contexts, which is: there is an object that is red and that has
some shape.
Example 4. The most specific common pattern in
{ obj(o1), clr(o1,re), shp(o1,sq), obj(o2), clr(o2,gr), shp(o2,tr), relpos(o1,lo,o2) }
{ obj(o3), clr(o3,gr), shp(o3,tr), obj(o4), clr(o4,re), shp(o4,tr), relpos(o3,lo,o4) }
is
{ obj(B), clr(B,re), shp(B,D), obj(E), clr(E,gr), shp(E,tr),
obj(A), clr(A,C), shp(A,D), relpos(A,lo,F), obj(F), clr(F,G), shp(F,tr) }.
It captures that, in both contexts, there is a red object (B), a green triangle
(E), and an object (A) to the left of a triangle (F). It may seem strange that
this clause refers to four objects, when each context had only two, but note that
different variables do not have to refer to different objects. In the first clause,
A = B and E = F , but in the second clause A = E and B = F . Identifying all
commonalities between the two contexts cannot be done with fewer than four
object references, because they unify differently in both contexts.
Our algorithm incrementally learns the meaning of specific n-grams. When-
ever it sees a new example with context C and phrase S, it iterates over all
the n-grams in S, and for each n-gram, it replaces the currently stored meaning
of the n-gram by the lgg of that meaning and the new context. Pseudocode is
shown in Algorithm 1 (main algorithm and Update procedure). For reasons
made clear below, the algorithm also remembers the category of each constant
(e.g., a constant that occurs as the second argument of color is a color), Update
also keeps track of how long ago the meaning of an n-gram was last changed
(stability counter), and Update may assert or retract mrf (“may refer to”) facts.
3.4 Generalizing n-grams
There is often a relationship between the meaning of an n-gram and that of
k-grams with k < n it is composed of. For instance, compare:
“red triangle”: there is an object that is both triangular and red
“red”: there is an object that is red
“triangle”: there is an object that is triangular
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This particular relationship is common to all bigrams of the form “color shape”.
A learner that recognizes the concepts “color” and “shape” may detect this. We
try to give our learner this capacity in the following manner.
When the meaning of a 1-gram w seems to have converged (that is, it has not
changed for the last s updates, with s a parameter called the stability threshold)
to a context that contains only one constant c, the learner assumes that the
1-gram refers to that constant. The fact mrf(w, c) is then asserted. (Should
w’s meaning change anyway later on, it is retracted again, since this implies it
was asserted prematurely.)
The learner tries to generalize n-grams for n > 1 using this mrf mapping
by constructing a more general rule, as follows (see also Generalize in Algo-
rithm 1). A word w in the n-gram is turned into a variable Xw if a corresponding
mrf(w,c) is available; in the n-gram’s meaning, each occurrence of c is then turned
into a variable Xc, and the condition mrf(Xw, Xc) is added to the body of the
rule. The category of c is also added to the body as a condition; this guarantees
“cautious” generalization: everything we know about the word is added so that
a maximally specific rule is obtained.
For instance, after mrf(red,re) and mrf(triangle, tr) have been learned, the fact
meaning(ngram(2, [red, triangle]), [object(O), color(O, re), shape(O,tr), size(O, )])
can be generalized into the rule
meaning(ngram(2, [X,Y]) , [object(O), color(O, C), shape(O,S), size(O, )]) :-
mrf(X,C), mrf(Y,S), category(C,color,2), category(S,shape,2).
This rule essentially generalizes the meaning of the 2-gram “red triangle” into
an equivalent meaning for any 2-gram of the type “color shape”.
Any n-gram can be generalized in this manner, but the resulting rule is not
necessarily correct. To evaluate the rule, we define two criteria: evidence (how
much evidence is there that the rule is correct?) and coverage (how many separate
facts could be replaced if we introduced this rule in the knowledge base?).
Let C be the set of all previously observed n-grams for which a meaning is
predicted by rule R. Let S ⊆ C contain all n-grams whose (currently stored)
meaning is subsumed by the meaning predicted by R, and E ⊆ S ⊆ C all n-
grams whose meaning is equivalent to the one predicted by R. Every n-gram
in E is predicted correctly by R. Every n-gram in S − E is compatible with
R, in the sense that its meaning may still converge to the predicted meaning
after seeing more examples. Any n-gram in C − S contradicts the rule: further
updates cannot lead to a meaning equivalent to the prediction. We call a rule
valid if S = C, and we call |C| the coverage of the rule.
The fact that a rule is valid does not provide strong evidence for its cor-
rectness. A rule that predicts an empty pattern is automatically valid, but does
not capture any meaning. The n-grams in E, however, do provide evidence: the
larger E is, the less likely it is that the rule accidentally predicts all the meanings
of all these n-grams correctly. |E| is called the evidence for the rule.
The utility of the rule is related to |C|, but our confidence in its correctness is
related to |E|. In practice, it seems reasonable to only consider valid rules whose
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Algorithm 1 The learning algorithm
Input: stability threshold s, evidence threshold e, stream of context/phrase examples D
Output: predicate definition for meaning
whenever a new example (C, S) ∈ D is presented:
for each constant c occurring as the i’th argument of a predicate p in C:
assert category(c,p,i) (if not asserted yet)
for each n-gram G in S, with n=1, 2, . . .
update(C, G)
generalize(G)
update(context C, n-gram G):
if meaning(G, M) then
if lgg(M ,C) = M then
increase stability(G) by 1
if G is a 1-gram, stability(G)=s, and M contains one constant c
then assert mrf(G,c); cleanUp
else
retract meaning(G, M); assert meaning(G, lgg(M , C)); stability(G)=0
retract mrf(G, );
else assert meaning(G, C); stability(G)=0
generalize(n-gram G) :
call meaning(G,M)
Ref = {(w, c)|w ∈ G ∧mrf(w, c)}
Cat = {(c, x, i)|( , c) ∈ Ref ∧ category(c, x, i)}
R = meaning(G, M) :-
∧
(w,c)∈Ref mrf(w, c),
∧
(c,x,i)∈Cat category(c, x, i)
introduce for each w and c in Ref a different variable Xw, Xc
replace in R each w and c by the corresponding Xw or Xc
if R is valid and has evidence ≥ e then assert R; cleanUp
cleanUp : retract each meaning(G,M) fact covered by a rule R
|E| is above some threshold, which is what our current algorithm does. Note that
when R gets introduced, it replaces not only the previously stored meanings of
the n-grams in E, but also those in S − E. For the latter, the currently stored
meaning gets replaced by what the rule predicts will be their converged meaning;
in other words, the rule boosts their convergence.
4 Experiments
To evaluate our model and learning algorithm, we made an example genera-
tor that generates random contexts and for each context a random phrase that
describes (part of) it in English, Dutch or Spanish. Each context consists of
one or two objects with a shape, color, size, and relative position. The phrases
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object(11),shape(11,tr),color(11,re),size(11,me), a red triangle to the
object(12),shape(12,he),color(12,pu),size(12,bg), left of the big hexagon
rel pos(11,lo,12)
object(52), shape(52,he), color(52,ye), size(52,sm) the hexagon
Table 2. Some examples of contexts and relevant phrases.
are generated using a simple probabilistic grammar and are surrounded by the
markers $start and $stop, so that n-grams can refer to the beginning and ending
of a phrase. For phrases referring to two objects, the format is the same as that
used by Angluin and Becerra-Bonache [2]. Table 2 shows a few representative
examples. We have generated three corpora (one for each language) of 1000 ex-
amples each. The two parameters of the learner, stability threshold and evidence
threshold, were both set to 5.
4.1 Learning meanings
Running the learning algorithm on the corpora led to the following observations
about the learning process.
It is known from ILP that the size of an lgg can grow exponentially in the
number of instances generalized (see, e.g., [10]). In our experiments, this behav-
ior was indeed observed. Eventually, meanings always converge to a relatively
simple pattern, but intermediate patterns can be very complex due to acciden-
tal similarities among contexts. As subsumption testing is exponential in the
length of clauses, this slows down the system unacceptably. We solved this prob-
lem by simply not updating the meaning of an n-gram if the new meaning is
too complex (specifically, lggs containing over 15 literals were not stored). Such
behavior is in fact cognitively plausible: children are unlikely to discover such
complex commonalities. Better ways of controlling the complexity of lggs exist,
but for our experiments, this simple method worked well.
For English, a learning curve was observed with (among other) the following
“milestones” (the number indicates the number of examples seen at this point):
79 the “color shape” generalized bigram is learned. The mrf map at this point
contains 4 colors and 5 shapes, hence the rule predicts the meaning of 20
combinations. 5 predictions are equivalent to the stored meaning, 14 gener-
alize it (boosting convergence), 1 is for a bigram not seen before.
85 mrf(to,bg) is retracted. Apparently, the system had earlier concluded that
“to” means bg (big), because that was the only constant common in all
its contexts and it remained present in the next 5 contexts. When finally a
context for “to” without a big object is seen, bg disappears from the meaning;
it is then clear that mrf(to,bg) was added prematurely, and it is retracted.
86 mrf(disc,di) is added. The meanings of “red disc” and “blue disc” are re-
tracted, as they are now subsumed by the color-shape rule.
89 the “size shape” generalized bigram is learned.
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102 mrf(yellow,ye) is added. All colors and shapes have now been learned.
165 the “size color” generalized bigram is learned.
188 “$start the color shape $stop” is learned (this pattern forms a full phrase)
416 the “size color shape” generalized trigram is learned.
664 “shape to the relpos of” is learned. This is an overgeneralization: it correctly
covers the words “left” and “right”, but incorrectly also “above”, “below”
and “under”, all of which are associated with relative positions.
The learning curves for Dutch and Spanish are similar. However, due to the
inflection of adjectives in these languages (and the fact that our representation
does not express morphological structure), some forms occur less frequently and
get generalized later than in English. Further, more rules overgeneralize because
they do not impose, for instance, gender correspondence. This leads to the im-
portant observation that our model categorizes in the physical world, but not in
the language world (it distinguishes color and shape as difference kinds of prop-
erties, but does not categorize words for shapes into masculine and feminine
because these are syntactic, not physical, properties).
Retraction of an mrf fact happened only twice: the word “to” in English and
“van” in Dutch. There are also incorrect mrf facts that are not retracted. Most
notably, the definite article “het” in Dutch is believed to refer to a square. The
reason is that among 6 shapes, only the Dutch word for square, “vierkant”, uses
this article. Thus, “het” only occurs when a square is present, and its meaning
is indistinguishable to that of “vierkant”. This mistake has dire consequences: as
“het” is assumed to refer to a shape, “het oranje vierkant” is seen as an example
of the pattern shape color shape, and generalized. Because there are 6 examples
of such trigrams (for 6 different colors), and all have the same meaning as the
one predicted by the rule, the system finds the evidence sufficient for introducing
the generalized rule.
To some extent, this problem is an artifact of the fact that we have only one
shape that uses that article: it would disappear if we had at least two. But it still
points to at least two opportunities for improving our learning model. First, the
fact that “het” occurs in positions where other shapes do not occur should be an
indication that it is not a shape at all. Again, this would require analyzing the
sentence structure when categorizing words, which our algorithm currently does
not do. Second, our method for evaluating evidence (just counting the number
of n-grams in E) assumes that that evidence is statistically independent. This
is not the case here: all evidence for the incorrect pattern has “het” for the first
word, not just any shape. Our evidence criterion needs to be refined.
4.2 Using the model
Until now, we have mostly focused on the learning process, but the proposed
model representation also makes a variety of inferences very easy to perform. We
illustrate a few of these. All inferences are made using a model learned from the
full corpus, and performed on the context {object(90), shape(90,tr), color(90,re),
size(90,me), object(91), shape(91,he), color(91,pu), size(91,bg), rel pos(90,lo,91)},
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which states that a medium-sized red triangle is to the left of a big purple
hexagon.
Generating relevant n-grams and phrases. The model can generate
n-grams that are relevant in some context, by simply checking which n-grams
have a meaning that matches part of the context. By chaining such n-grams,
we can produce complete phrases that in principle could be grammatically or
semantically incorrect, but in practice work well for the simple contexts here
provided. Chaining English 3-grams (with 2 words of overlap) gives 24 phrases
for our running context, all of which are correct; they include: “the big hexagon”;
“a big purple hexagon”; “the red triangle to the left of the big hexagon”; etc.
For the same context, generated Spanish phrases include “el hexagono pur-
pura y grande”, “un triangulo rojo”, but also the incorrect “un triangulo roja”.
Dutch phrases produced for this context are all correct; they include, e.g., “de
grote driehoek naast een grote paarse zeshoek”.5
Identifying objects. We can easily ask which part of a given context, if
any, matches the meaning of a given n-gram. For the n-gram “purple hexagon”,
the system returns {object(91),shape(91,he),color(91,pu),size(91,bg)}, correctly
identifying the big purple hexagon as an object matching the description.
Producing denoting phrases. A phrase is denoting if it uniquely identifies
one object in a context. The ability to denote objects is important because it
is one of the main purposes of using language. Our system can easily produce
denoting phrases for some context by generating a phrase, finding what it iden-
tifies, and returning it if it identifies exactly one object. In the running context,
the following denoting phrases (among others) are returned: “a big hexagon”,
“the hexagon”, “a big purple hexagon”, “the red triangle”, . . .
Note that our approach could be useful in the Referring Expression Genera-
tion domain, which concerns with how to produce a description that identifies an
specific entity in a given context [12]. It could also have interesting implications
for the field of Computer Vision, for example, by providing semantic connections
between different objects detected in a concrete context.
Translating sentences. Meaningful n-grams can be translated simply by
asking for an n-gram in another language with an equivalent meaning. E.g.:
?- meaning(ngram(4, [the, big, blue, triangle]), , C1), meaning(L, spanish, C2),
equiv(C1,C2).
(where equiv tests equivalence) gives as possible answers for L the 5-gram ngram(5,
[el,triangulo,azul,y,grande]), but also versions with un, la, una instead of el. Trans-
lations are only correct insofar the system understands the phrases (it has not
learned the meaning of articles, and therefore cannot distinguish the meanings of
“the red triangle” and “a red triangle”), and as said before the system currently
does not learn gender correspondence.
5 With a model learned from 2000 examples, the incorrect phrase “driehoek rode
driehoek” was produced; this is a consequence of the belief that “het” is a shape,
and the construction of a rule for shape color shape as a consequence.
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It is worth noting that most work in Machine Translation focuses on syntactic-
based approaches, but their limitations to preserve meaning structures across
languages have motivated research on semantic-based machine translation (e.g.,
[18, 8]). Our approach mainly differs from these semantic approaches in that we
do not use a parallel corpus consisting of sentence/meaning pairs. Moreover, it
can be viewed as a first step towards systems that are able to use the context to
translate sentences from one language to another, while preserving the meaning.
5 Conclusions and future work
We have presented a simple model for grounded language learning that uses a
first-order logic representation of contexts and meanings. Our system learns to
understand and generate simple natural language utterances, from pairs consist-
ing of utterances and the context in which these utterances are produced. In
contrast to other approaches, a context is a description of what the learner can
see in the world, and not a set of candidates meanings for that utterance; our
system constructs all candidate meanings itself. It does not require any prior
language-specific knowledge and learns incrementally. Experiments with three
different languages show that our system learns a language model that can eas-
ily be used to understand, generate and translate utterances.
This paper describes a simple proof of concept. Opportunities for further
work include: learning from more complex contexts (which may include actions),
learning more complex languages, categorizing also n-grams (as opposed to only
context elements), controlling the lgg complexity in a more principled manner,
experimenting with other inductive inference methods known from inductive
logic programming, robust learning in noisy environments (probabilistic logics
may be useful for this), and much more.
It is worth noting that the development of computational approaches such as
this one can help obtain insight into how children build a model of language and
make connections between utterances and contexts. It can also help understand
how language developed from its origins, since the observation of the world and
the intention to communicate were crucial for the development of language.
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